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 A Scarred Tympanum 
CHIARA ALFANO 
 
 
 
 
[....] nothing of human interest should be ruled out as beneath 
philosophical interest [....] 
CAVELL, Little Did I Know 
 
Who beside myself could give me the authority to speak for us? 
CAVELL, A Pitch of Philosophy  
 
 
Philosophy is no stranger to autobiography. Yet, despite the fact that we know, thanks 
to Augustine and Descartes, to Rousseau and Nietzsche, that autobiography can be 
philosophically useful, the grounds for autobiography’s philosophical significance 
still evade us. Good detectives that we are, we rummage for clues, for biographical 
facts that may throw light on this or the other philosophical conundrum, when we 
have known all along that life told is more philosophically eloquent than life lived. In 
all of our attempts to recount our lives — to a loved one, to a therapist, to ourselves — 
there are incidents that seem almost naturally to take precedent over others. Mem-
ory, in this sense, works inconsistently, perhaps prejudicially; its retrospective light 
illuminating some events, which subsequently become important to us, whilst leaving 
others in the dark. The term that Freud might have used to describe this phenome-
non is Nachträglichkeit, an untranslatable word announcing memory’s deferred ac-
tion, the fact that some incidents only gain significance retrospectively. Nach-
träglichkeit in its widest possible sense thus describes the fact that whilst life is lived 
forwards, it can only be understood backwards. This is also true for Stanley Cavell’s 
autobiographical writings, in which one childhood event in particular emerges as phi-
losophically decisive.  
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 One day, when he had not yet turned seven, Cavell was “hit by a car as [he] ran 
headlong into [their] most uneventful street to retrieve a ball.”1 Revisiting this event 
again in Little Did I Know, he elaborates: “I had been struck and knocked uncon-
scious by an automobile as I ran out into the street, just up and across the street from 
my old house and Atlanta Avenue.”2 He fleshes the memory out further: “I seem to 
have the sensation as well as an image of running down the Jacobs’s driveway into 
the street, without a glance in any direction but straight ahead, along with an image 
that I associate with the impression of a car bearing down on me as I was picking up 
the ball I had chased into the street.”3 This accident left Cavell with “a scarred tympa-
num.”4 He writes: 
 
Given that this consequence of the accident was fundamentally to affect the 
course of my life, it is hard to believe that I did not become aware of it until 
sometime after I returned to school, and indeed not until a while after we 
moved to the north side and I began to undergo excruciating treatments de-
signed, so far as I was told, to keep the misshapen ear canal from narrowing 
further than it already had done.5 
  
Although the account of this accident, the events at the hospital that followed and the 
subsequent painful treatment of his ear are fragmentary, and take up only a couple of 
pages in A Pitch of Philosophy and Little Did I Know, their significance cannot be 
overstated. If “nothing of human interest should be ruled out as beneath philosophi-
cal interest,” it will come as no surprise that the aftershock of being hit by a car on 
that most uneventful street should also be felt in Cavell’s philosophical work.6  
 Tinnitus, a ringing, buzzing or humming in the ears in the apparent absence of 
any external sound — a possible symptom of the “endless series of ear infections” that 
Cavell suffered after his accident — haunts the philosopher’s writing.7 In The Claim of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 1. Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 25. 
 2. Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 27. 
 3. Ibid., 27-28. 
 4. Cavell, Pitch, 30. 
 5. Cavell, Little, 33. 
 6. Ibid. , 250. 
 7. Cavell, Pitch, 25. 
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Reason, when discussing the inability of criteria to assure us that the other truly is in 
pain, Cavell details what may be thought of as typical behaviour accompanying “a 
ringing in the ears,” such as “frown[ing] or open[ing] the mouth very wide so as to 
move the ears around” or “press[ing] your palms against them for a moment” or 
“shake[ing] the head vigorously once or twice and then listen.”8 People, he adds, 
“who haven’t had the experience probably won’t understand what you’re doing”; the 
implication is that the author understands it, that he is familiar with the gesture, that 
he has perhaps employed this method on the odd occasion himself.9 
 We seem to have arrived at a clean and clear intersection of autobiography and 
philosophy. The story of his scarred tympanum is, however, not merely drawn on for 
anecdotal flourishes. Instead it colors the way he views the issues at the heart of his 
philosophical project. In point of fact, the aural motif also surfaces in a preceding 
passage in The Claim of Reason, in which Cavell compares the Austinian question of 
whether or not there is a goldfinch in the garden, and the skeptical impulse to go and 
puncture it, with the question of whether or not a singer is in tune:  
 
I have no idea whether this bit of academic sadism would be making sure it’s 
real “in the same way” as I might have made sure it’s a goldfinch (unless 
someone wishes to insist that this is making sure it is a goldfinch, while an-
other might wish to insist that only God could really do that (as only a com-
poser can make sure that the tonic is well established (though who is it who 
makes sure that the singing is on pitch, the singer or the sung to?). 10 
  
In this wonderful sequence of parentheses within parentheses, the question of 
whether an other (I or God) can know that the goldfinch exists (or perhaps even that 
the goldfinch is in pain) is presented as similar or identical in philosophical force and 
significance as the question of whether the singer knows her own pitch better than 
the listener wincing at its flatness or sharpness (if this were the case there would be 
no more singing out of tune, I suppose; ears can lie). A couple of pages later the 
auricular motif returns not to illustrate but to allegorize skepticism. Again a phanto-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 8. Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 2nd edn., 80. 
9. Ibid., 80. 
 10. Ibid., 58. 
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matic noise plagues the writer, a noise that is concomitant with his inability to con-
firm that there is indeed a goldfinch in the garden: 
 
There is this humming in the air; or a noise at midnight in the basement — 
there it is again. Shall I say: “I don’t by any means always know…”, and let it go 
at that? But there aren’t just hummings in the air; it is imperative that I find 
out whether there happens to be one in the air now or whether it is only in my 
ears. Certainly I may not be able to learn the answer in this case, to convince 
myself one way or the other. But it won’t help my condition to say that some-
times I just don’t know. I am left with the question; it stays in me, until it de-
cays in my memory or I overlay it, perhaps symbolize it, with something else.11 
 
Here we find the problem of skepticism distilled clearly and devastatingly, like poison 
to be poured into ears.  
 The institution of philosophy, as it is traditionally understood, is perhaps un-
certain what to do with these passages. The prose may seem a touch too purple, the 
voice too idiosyncratic, the examples too elliptic to be pertinent to philosophical in-
vestigation. The explanation suggesting itself immediately, namely that the aural tint 
of these passages is a rhetorical gesture or an ephemeral residue of the musical life 
that preceded his philosophical career, seems within reason. It is also reasonable to 
remind ourselves that for a writer for whom style has always been an intrinsic part of 
philosophical investigation, there is no such thing as philosophically unimportant 
stylistic or figurative choices. The persistence of these aural tropes and of a fascina-
tion with the ear as an organ throughout Cavell’s oeuvre — his autobiographical work, 
his philosophical essays, as well as his literary criticism — alone should be enough to 
convince us. Thus we cannot help but notice that in his meditation on the ethical de-
mands of theater, the audience’s skeptical tendency to treat Othello’s behavior merely 
as acting is understood in terms of an acoustic interference: “an excuse, whistling in 
the dark.”12 We are similarly struck by a memory, related in Little Did I Know, of 
hearing “a faint low hum as if produced by the ground” nobody else could hear and its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 11. Cavell, Claim, 60. 
 12. Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987), 101. 
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subsequent incorporation, six decades later, into the reading of the Overture of The 
Marriage of Figaro “as expressing the hum of the world, specifically the restlessness 
of the people of the world.”13  
 Cavell’s projection of the skeptical impulse — our restless inability to ac-
knowledge our separateness and our denial to acknowledge others — to the ear 
culminates in his definition of skepticism as “the denial of the need to listen” and as 
“the refusal of the ear.”14 The skeptical problem has been transposed, and is here 
presented as both a distortion of our auditory sense and a denial of the way we or-
dinarily listen. Skepticism is thus not only made out as a confusion of the soul, but 
as a confusion of our ears. As these passages suggest, Cavell’s penchant for aural, 
musical or auricular themes is not an indulgence, but communicates on a deeper 
level with a set of questions — skepticism, separateness, and acknowledgment — 
that are at the heart of his philosophy. The answer as to why skepticism is here 
transposed to the ear will also provide an insight into why, for Cavell, autobiogra-
phy is philosophically significant. 
 In Cavell’s writing, the role of autobiography, and in particular the stories sur-
rounding his scarred tympanum, belie the idea of autobiography as a minor, solely 
auxiliary, genre to his principal philosophical preoccupation. The story of Cavell’s 
scarred tympanum is not ancillary but essential to his philosophy. Prosaically speak-
ing, without the accident Cavell may have not become a philosopher. Both A Pitch of 
Philosophy and Little Did I Know in fact relate the story of how his scarred tympa-
num twice thwarted his intentions to join the war effort, first in 1943 and then a year 
later in 1944, thus propelling him initially towards a life of music and then to one of 
philosophy.15 However, Cavell’s scarred tympanum not only merits our attention be-
cause, closing some of life’s doors and opening others, it set him on the path of phi-
losophy. It should command our attention because “a philosopher’s or writer’s auto-
biography [...] tells the writer’s story of the life out of which he came to be a (his kind 
of) writer.”16 Put differently, Cavell’s autobiographical writings, and in particular the 
story of his scarred tympanum, tell not only of the how but also of the why of his phi-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 13. Cavell, Little, 99, 100. 
 14. Giovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher: Conversations with Quine, Davidson, 
Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre and Kuhn (Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 133. 
 15. Cavell, Little, 166-8. Cavell, Pitch, 32. 
 16. Cavell, Little, 5-6. 
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losophy. The autobiographical story of his scarred tympanum is, I would like to sug-
gest, the primal scene of his philosophy. 
 Although as a line of inquiry it is not without merit, I am not making the case 
here for the philosophical importance of Cavell’s life an sich. Distinguishing between 
lived and told experience, between life and what calls for its recounting, between 
events and their nachträglich interpretation is crucial. Being first and foremost a 
reader, I am interested in what the literariness of Cavell’s writing can tell us about his 
philosophical project. What is, philosophically speaking, interesting to me is how the 
terms which frame the autobiographical account of his turn to philosophy echo the 
figurative themes that surface repeatedly in his description and diagnosis of skepti-
cism in The Claim of Reason and Disowning Knowledge. What intrigues me, in other 
words, is how on closer inspection the resonances between the auricular narrative 
strands in his autobiographical and philosophical work demonstrate that the events 
related to his scarred tympanum are philosophically formative and foundational.  
  The aural tropes interspersed throughout Cavell’s work are, I maintain, not 
separate instances of a stylistic and thematic extravagance. Despite their fragmentary 
or elliptical nature the au(ral)tobiographical narratives — including the story of his 
scarred tympanum, his mother’s perfect pitch (and his lack of it), his life of music and 
then of philosophy — have to be understood, if not as an easily fathomable whole, 
then as significantly linked and mutually inflecting meditations on what he wants of 
philosophy. By drawing links between the story of his damaged left ear; his reading of 
the ear-poisoning in Hamlet’s dumb-show and how it relates to Janet Adelman’s 
work on the role of mothers in Shakespearean tragedy; his account of his mother’s 
perfect pitch; and the story of how he turned from music via psychoanalysis to phi-
losophy, I am suggesting that the tale of the “scarred tympanum” and other related 
auricular narrative strands are not merely philosophically significant but in fact phi-
losophically exegetic. In fact, as I will go on to argue, the resonances between his 
Shakespeare criticism and his autobiographical writings, between his diagnosis of the 
skeptic’s plight and the story of how he became a philosopher, allow us to locate his 
philosophical catalyst. Paying heed to the echoes between these different au(ral)to-
biographical narratives will thus help us fathom what Cavell wants of philosophy and 
why autobiography must be a part of it and why any philosophy worth doing must be 
an abstraction of autobiography. 
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Mother  
 
The element linking the autobiographical story of Cavell’s scarred tympanum to his 
philosophical work, indeed to his philosophical vocation, is to be found in his Shake-
speare criticism. At the end of “Hamlet’s Burden of Truth,” Cavell turns with consid-
erable interest to the strange detail of the ear-poisoning in Hamlet’s dumb-show. 
“Anon come in [a Player as] another man, takes off his crown, kisses it, pours poison 
in the sleeper’s ears and leaves him. The queen returns, finds the king dead, makes 
passionate action.”17 This is the first time we hear about the supposed method of King 
Hamlet’s murder. Standing on uncertain ground, Hamlet is, it seems, not content 
with testing his mother and Claudius alone; with the inclusion of the ear-poisoning 
he is also testing the ghost. The dumb-show has widely been read as marking a mo-
ment of crisis in Hamlet, furthermore one inextricable from the skepto-tragic 
mechanism of the play. What precipitates this moment of crisis is not the doubted ve-
racity of the ghost’s assertions, however. Rather, the strange detail of the ear-
poisoning points to a different anxiety at the root of Hamlet’s skepticism — one hav-
ing to do with neither the Ghost nor with Claudius, but instead with his mother.  
 Cavell proposes that we look at the dumb-show as Hamlet’s “invention” or “fan-
tasy,” more specifically “a fantasy that deciphers into the memory of a primal scene, a 
scene of parental intercourse.”18 In support of this hypothesis Cavell identifies in the 
dumb-show the two reversals key to Freud’s interpretation of the Wolf Man’s case in 
The Interpretation of Dreams: first turning one thing into its opposite and second re-
versing passive into active. Changing “one thing into its opposite,” the dumb-show, he 
argues, replaces Gertrude with Claudius.19 This reversal does not point to Hamlet’s 
conviction that his mother took part in the murder, but rather that “Hamlet feels her 
power as annihilating of his own,” indeed that his father was annihilated by this power 
before him.20 In Cavell’s reading, the dumb-show qua primal scene thus re-enacts not 
merely his father’s murder (or Gertrude’s involvement therein) but in reproducing pa-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, 3.2.128.4-7. 
 18. Cavell, Disowning, 182-3.  
 19. Ibid., 184. 
 20. Cavell, Disowning, 185. 
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rental intercourse — “one finds a man collapsing not upon her pouring something into 
him but upon her having poured something into her (the reversal of passive into ac-
tive)” — the devastating power of women over men.21  
 Although it is not mentioned, Joel Fineman’s work on the early modern asso-
ciations between the ear and female sexuality resonates in Cavell’s reading of the 
pouring of poison into King Hamlet’s ear.22 Neither in Shakespeare nor in Cavell, 
however, is the feminized ear merely passive. Just as the ears of Shakespeare’s female 
characters are often portrayed as active, even voracious, the ear is both agent and re-
ceptacle of the contamination.23 In Cavell’s conception of the dumb-show as primal 
scene and, in particular, in his interpretation of the ear-poisoning, Gertrude’s sexual-
ity emerges as the contaminant corroding first Hamlet the elder and then, potentially, 
his son. Here, as in Cavell’s descriptions of a skeptical confusion of the ears in The 
Claim of Reason or in the Introduction of Disowning Knowledge, the question of 
skepticism is transposed to the ear. Yet whilst in The Claim of Reason the skeptical 
tendency is manifested as an auditory interference — as an unwillingness to hear or 
as a precarious attunement — here the ear channels anxieties about the skeptic’s ma-
ternal origin, which are at the heart of the skeptical impulse.  
 Janet Adelman’s work on the role mothers play in Shakespearean tragedy is an 
important influence on both “Hamlet’s Burden of Truth” and Cavell’s understanding of 
the essential correlation between tragedy and skepticism.24 In Suffocating Mothers, 
Adelman argues that from Hamlet onward a certain view of female, and in particular 
maternal, sexuality and tragedy are concomitant. In these plays maternal sexuality is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 21. Ibid., 185. 
 22. Joel Fineman, “Shakespeare’s Ear,” Representations 28 (1989): 10. Looking at The “Rain-
bow” Portrait of Queen Elizabeth I, attributed to Isaac Oliver (c. 1600), Fineman notes that among the 
eyes, mouths and ears adorning the Queen’s dress there is an “exceptionally pornographic ear” formed 
by two creases in Elizabeth’s dress precisely over her genitals (10). Here Fineman is playing on the as-
sociations between aural and the sexual organs prevalent in early modern conceptions of the fem-
inised, passive ear – as epitomised, for example, in the belief, propagated by folklore as well as theo-
logical discourse, that at the Annunciation the Virgin Mary conceived Jesus through the ear. See Wes 
Folkerth, The Sound of Shakespeare (New York: Routledge, 2002), 47. 
 23. Folkerth for instance notes that Cleopatra “implores a messenger to thrust his words into 
her ears, suggestively instructing him to ‘Ram thou thy fruitful tidings in mine ears, / That long time 
have been barren’.” (107).  
 24. Adelman is mentioned at three important junctures in Disowning Knowledge: in the cru-
cial passage of the Hamlet essay just discussed, in Cavell’s reading of Coriolanus and his second, less 
well known, comment on King Lear in Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes. 
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perceived as “the initial premise of tragedy, the fall that brings death into the world.”25 
The fantasy by which Shakespeare’s tragic heroes project anxieties about mortality and 
subjectivity onto women’s bodies is, according to Adelman, rooted in early modern 
conceptions of pregnancy and nursing where the mother was thought to hold tyran-
nous sway over the child’s life and death. Associations between womb and tomb were 
strong in the period. Women were not only believed to be able to suffocate their child 
in their womb if they so wished, but birth itself was understood “as the fetus’s response 
to the inadequate supply of air or food in the womb.”26 According to this view the 
mother’s body is, for the child, a source of both pleasure and peril: longed for and 
feared in equal measure. Cavell’s image of Hamlet as “resisting birth, holding back 
from existence,” or wishing to “remai[n] in his mother’s womb, as if always buried 
alive, or caught in the passage out” echoes Adelman’s account.27 
  Just as Suffocating Mothers resonates throughout Cavell’s reading of Shake-
speare, Adelman’s work is deeply indebted to his interpretation of the skeptical prob-
lem. In Adelman’s work, the selfhood that Hamlet constructs in response to the per-
ceived maternal threat, for example, bears a striking resemblance to Cavell’s defini-
tion of skepticism.28 Like the skeptic, Hamlet withdraws from the world, retreating 
“into what he imagines as an inviolable core of selfhood that cannot be played 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 25. Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s 
Plays Hamlet to The Tempest (New York: Routledge, 1992), 17. 
 26. Ibid., 6. After birth the mother’s life-giving and life-taking abilities were not thought to 
grow any weaker; mother’s milk was deemed unsafe for consumption for up to a month after birth. 
Even though wet-nurses, to whom children were routinely sent, often had “contaminated or insuffi-
cient milk,” malnutrition meant the nursing period often lasted for up to two or three years (4). After 
experiencing “a prolonged period of infantile dependency, during which they were subject to pleasures 
and dangers especially associated with nursing and the maternal body,” children would then be sub-
jected to a sudden weaning process “routinely by the application of wormwood or another bitter-
tasting substance to the nipple - and abrupt separation from the nurse - mother he or she might have 
known for two or more years” (5). This prolonged dependency and traumatic separation, Adelman 
suggests in her book, would have had devastating consequences for the infant’s sense of self and at-
tachment. Adelman’s work on early-modern conceptions of nursing are thus also felt in Cavell’s read-
ing of the scene in The Winter’s Tale, in which Mamillius’ whisperings into Hermione’s ear are seen as 
precipitating Leontes’ skeptical spiral. Cavell suggests that Leontes’ skepticism is stirred by his envy of 
the intimate relations between, on the one hand, Hermione and her unborn child and, on the other, 
Hermione and Mamillius, whose name is reminiscent of a nursing infant. See Cavell, Disowning, 196. 
This reading opens yet another set of intriguing parallels between Cavell’s and Winnicott’s works, par-
ticularly his ideas relating to “the nursing couple.” 
 27. Cavell, Disowning, 14. 
 28. Cavell is in fact one of the “four dear friends” or “gracious presences” that were in Adel-
man’s “head throughout the writing of [Suffocating Mothers].” See Adelman, Suffocating, x. The acci-
dental meeting of akin minds and the ensuing catalysis of ideas is perhaps another instance of life’s 
sway over philosophy.  
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upon.”29 Hamlet, like a true skeptic, constructs “an absolute barrier between inner 
and outer.”30 Like the skeptic philosopher who eschews the ordinary in favor of 
metaphysics, Hamlet believes that only “magical thinking,” can overcome this bar-
rier.31 The influence of Cavell’s thinking on Adelman becomes explicit in her reading 
of Leontes’ crisis of faith as “the loss of faith in the world outside the self: what Cavell 
calls ‘skepticism’s annihilation of the world’.”32  
 Just as for Adelman a nachträglich discerned difficult relationship to the 
mother recurs in tragedy, for Cavell it is a symptom of skepticism. Yet, a clear distinc-
tion between adult projection and infant experience is not easily drawn. By “associat-
ing [the skeptics’] crisis of faith specifically with the mother’s body,” Adelman is not 
only calling on early modern conceptions of motherhood and infancy, but is also ref-
erencing contemporary psychoanalytic theories of early child development.33 In this 
sense, the connection between skepticism and the mother’s body also rests upon “the 
insights of Winnicott,” for whom the individual’s ability to “hope that there is a live 
relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary crea-
tivity and the world at large”;34 in other words, the individual’s ability to resist the 
skeptical impulse is here envisioned as depending on whether their mother is able to 
respond to them appropriately during the months of infancy.35  
 Adelman is neither merely drawing on Cavellian conceptions of skepticism, 
nor simply offering a psychoanalytic interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy. By in-
terweaving early modern notions of and psychoanalytical insights into the mother-
infant relationship her work seems to imply that the tragic hero’s fantasies of mater-
nal origin are rooted in a psychoanalytic actuality and are thus also relevant for Cav-
ell’s thinking about skepticism. In doing so, she crucially highlights where Winni-
cott’s notion of the detrimental effects of a prolonged misattunement between mother 
and infant are compatible with what fuels the skeptic’s hamartia, that is, his compul-
sion to “interpret a metaphysical finitude as an intellectual lack.”36 When Adelman 
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 29. Adelman, Suffocating, 29. 
 30. Ibid. 
 31. Ibid. 
 32. Ibid., 359. 
 33. Ibid. 
34. D. W. Winnicot, The Child, the Family, and the Outside World (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1964), 90.  
35. Ibid. 
 36. Cavell, Disowning, 11. 
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claims that “Cavell’s formulations” about skepticism are “congruent” with Winnicott’s 
understanding of the mother-infant relationship, she is thus also arguing for the psy-
choanalytical element of Cavell’s interpretation of skepticism.37 In seeming support of 
Adelman’s reading, Cavell suggests elsewhere: “In my own limited experience with 
children, certainly they are having problems that eventually, we know, as they flower, 
will become philosophical issues.”38 
 We find the clearest formulation of the link between Cavell’s interpretation of 
skepticism and the mother-infant relationship in the “Introduction” to Disowning 
Knowledge: “what philosophy registers as uncertainty in our knowledge of the exis-
tence of the world is a function of, say intellectualization of, the child’s sense of loss in 
separating from the mother’s body.”39 Here the “denial by the mother,” to be read in 
Winnicott’s sense as the mother’s intended or unintended inability to respond to the 
child appropriately, is brought “in juxtaposition with the denial of the world,” in 
other words the skeptic’s rejection of the world.40 The detour through Adelman, more 
precisely through her juxtaposition of Cavell and Winnicott, clarifies what is at stake 
with “the child’s sense of loss in separating from the mother’s body” described in Dis-
owning Knowledge.41 At issue is not, as Adelman briefly suggests in her reading of 
Cavell, the son’s oedipal desire for his mother. Cavell’s reading of the dumb-show as 
the staging of a “double acceptance” — “acceptance of one’s mother as an independ-
ent sexual being whose life of desire survives the birth of a son and the death of a 
husband, a life that may present itself to her son as having been abandoned by her” 
and the “acceptance of one’s father as a dependent sexual being [...] which may pre-
sent itself to his son as having to abandon him” — does not hinge on the child’s desire 
for the mother’s body, but rather on his loss of union with her body.42 At stake is his 
desire to affirm individuality and subjectivity as distinct from his mother.43  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 37. Adelman, Suffocating, 359. Although it is impossible to ascertain whether Cavell also saw 
the connection to Winnicott that Adelman brings out, he briefly touches on Winnicott’s concept of a 
“holding environment” in connection with the importance of acknowledging children’s seemingly triv-
ial anxieties. See Naoko Saito and Paul Standish, eds., Stanley Cavell and The Education of Grownups 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 147. 
38. Saito and Standish, Education, 147. 
 39. Cavell, Disowning, 13. 
 40. Ibid., 13. 
 41. Ibid. 
 42. Ibid., 189. 
43. Although in Cavell’s work skepticism is conceived of as a largely male affair, it is important 
to bear in mind that this association is not essential. Undoubtedly, Shakespeare’s male tragic heroes, 
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 The crux of the dumb-show as primal scene is Hamlet’s, is the skeptic’s, anxi-
ety about who he is. At its heart is thus, in Cavell’s words, “the origin of the individ-
ual” and the question of “how he or anyone lets himself be born as the one he is.”44 
The skeptic’s anxieties, albeit projected onto the maternal body, are, as is so pithily 
put elsewhere, about himself: “I am the philosophical problem. I am.”45 Towards the 
end of the Hamlet essay, the ear-detail in the dumb-show is in fact no longer primar-
ily understood to symbolize the sexual act. Instead, Cavell focuses on the abstract 
content of the primal scene. He notes that for Freud the primal scene, or “phyloge-
netic inheritance,” is transmitted from parent to child by way of the ear: “the family 
sounds or sayings, the spoken or secret discourses, going on prior to the subject’s ar-
rival, within which he must take his way.”46 Cavell continues: “I hope you will be 
struck by the fit of this account with the fact that Hamlet’s fantasy of the dumb-show 
takes up something he heard from his ancestor’s ghost and that features the mortal 
vulnerability of the ear.”47 The mortal vulnerability of the ear here speaks to a pre-
carious sense of self, to the self’s inability to conceive of itself as separate, distinct and 
mortal.  
 Just as Cavell hoped we would hear the resonances between Freud’s under-
standing of the auricular mechanism of phylogenetic inheritance and the function of 
the ear in the dumb-show, I hope that you “will be struck by the fit” of Cavell’s ac-
count of the “mortal vulnerability of the ear” in Hamlet, his transposition of skepti-
cism to the ear in, amongst other places, The Claim of Reason and the stories of his 
scarred tympanum. Before the invention of sulpha drugs, the treatment of said dam-
aged ear consisted of the use of “heavy tweezers with elongated jaws to clamp upon 
increasing sizes of hard rubber tubes, or tight rolls of cotton, and force them into 
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[the] ear canal.”48 Pain, the incommunicability of our own pain and the inaccessibility 
of the pain of others, is a central motif in philosophy’s wrestling with skepticism. It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising that, looking back on his life, Cavell’s links the first 
stirrings of the his skeptical impulse to the excruciating treatments of his ear: 
 
[T]he primitiveness and painfulness of the early medical treatments of my ear 
[...] determined a general attempt to learn a distance from my body and so at-
tempts to undo that learning, and which will mould the common male doubt, 
at certain stages, that one specifically will bear up under torture.49 
 
The ear’s “mortal vulnerability” registers the skeptical impulse — to distance oneself 
from one’s body and hence one’s humanity — literally as well as figuratively. The 
scarred tympanum literally initiates the child to the human skeptical condition be-
cause it marks the child’s first conscious experience of pain and thus the first recogni-
tion that it is separate from its mother.50 Just as in Hamlet’s fabulated account of the 
ear-poisoning, it stands for the issue of inheritance, that is, for how we assert our 
subjectivity as our own and as distinct from our parents’. In Little Did I Know and A 
Pitch of Philosophy, the struggle for individuation is registered not merely in the ac-
count of Cavell’s scarred tympanum but also in the related narrative strand of perfect 
pitch: his recognition that unlike his mother he did not possess this magical faculty 
and his subsequent decision to trade musical for philosophical vocation. 
 
 
Perfect Pitch 
 
Cavell suggests that “the story of [his] ear as an organ of my body” inflects “certain 
questions of ear that run through [his] life,” questions also including “the realities 
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and fantasies of perfect pitch.”51 Despite conceding, a mere breath later, that he has 
not yet “fathomed” the interrelations between his au(ral)tobiographical narratives, 
this is the closest Cavell comes to stating the importance of the story of his scarred 
tympanum for his philosophy. The trauma of his left ear is, in fact, Cavell writes in 
Little Did I Know, “inextricable from the trauma of leaving music” and thus also im-
possible to separate from his turn to philosophy and, most importantly, to his pitch of 
philosophy.52 Indeed, in the “pages that record fragments of [his] life,” the questions 
of ear that run through his work (and life) grow ever more urgent to become “ques-
tions of the detections of voice,” the detection of a certain kind of philosophical voice 
and the right — not to mention the necessity — to take that voice.53 Put differently, 
the story of the scarred tympanum tells of how he becomes “his kind of writer.” 
 In order to begin to fathom how the story of his scarred tympanum colors the 
story of his perfect philosophical pitch we must turn once again to the account of his 
car accident. The car accident that left Cavell with a damaged left ear happened close 
to the house on Atlanta Avenue he shared with his parents, his maternal grand-
mother and his mother’s brothers. Although the accident happened when they were 
still living in the house on Atlanta Avenue, Cavell notes that he only became aware of 
the gravity of the damage to his left ear “after we moved to the north side.”54 The 
move away from the first family home he had ever known would prove no less dra-
matic than the accident and its consequences. In the autobiography the two traumatic 
events are in fact merged. Cavell speaks of this “move on turning seven years old” as a 
move away “from a house of continuous interest and talk and music to a set of moves 
and apartments in which [he] was largely abandoned to silence and to occasional 
strangers.”55  
 The move thus meant a removal from his mother’s musical and gregarious 
family to a life where he was either left alone or left alone with his parents’ difficult 
relationship. The account of his life spanning from this move to his leaving for college 
is pervaded by a deep sense of gratitude towards his parents, as well as by an acute 
experience of separateness. This feeling is mainly understood as a function of his par-
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ent’s lack of attunement, what is also called “their despair of harmony.”56 This musi-
cally tainted image is not coincidental; their differences are in point of fact viewed as 
a profound and unbridgeable difference of ear: what she was able to hear in music — 
“the glad unsayability of her knowledge of the utter expressiveness of music” — thus 
stands in marked contrast to what he could not but wishes he could hear, “his wild 
love of the eloquence he would never have.”57 It seems to me that the deferred realisa-
tion of the gravity of the damage to his left tympanum until after the move suggest 
that his auricular scar also speaks of his parents’ difference of ear and the crisis of vo-
cation it precipitated.58 
 Cavell’s mother, Fannie Segal, was an “extraordinary” musician and vignettes 
proclaiming her talent and the pleasure she took in music are present throughout 
the autobiographical work.59 Her talent was, Cavell writes, “natural” and “attested 
in the assured fire with which she played, for example, the Liszt Sixth and Thir-
teenth Hungarian Rhapsodies, the closing pages of Chopin First and Fourth Bal-
lades, or the Shultz-Elver arrangement of the ‘Blue Danube’.”60 What secured Fan-
nie Segal’s name as the best and most sought-after piano player in Atlanta more 
than anything else was “her uncanny ability to sightread.”61 Akin to this talent, was 
her “capacity to put aside any interference, as of her own will, and to let the body be 
moved, unmechanically, by the mind of those racing notes.”62 In A Pitch of Philoso-
phy this “lapse of distance — say that she was the music then and there; there was 
nothing beyond her to read into” is captured “by an image of a certain mood that 
caused her to play the piano for herself” in a “room darkened below the level at 
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which reading was possible.”63 Like for his father, for Cavell, his mother’s talent was 
a source of wonder and inspiration on the one hand and envy and desperation on 
the other.64 Indeed, until he picked up the clarinet on which he could approximate 
his mother’s sight-reading ability “music making [...] was essentially a separate land 
from which [his] mother would intermittently bring back news.”65 And even when 
music became something he could share with her, she could not share it with him, 
just as she could not share it with her husband: “Most of the time I felt I knew in 
which world my mother thought I took my bearings. But when she took refuge in 
hers, there seemed no further room.”66  
 In Little Did I Know, Cavell draws a striking parallel between his sense of iso-
lation as a child and Hamlet’s experience: “(So much of my adolescence was spent — 
perhaps much of adolescence means — hiding [because harboring?] knowledge of my 
elders. Like Hamlet).”67 While the affectionate nature of Cavell’s references to his 
mother could not be more removed from Hamlet’s treatment of his, the autobio-
graphical comparison to Hamlet points to a similarity between their roles in the nar-
ratives of their sons’ lives. In Adelman’s and Cavell’s readings of Hamlet, Gertrude is 
the maternal origin Hamlet can and cannot, wants and does not want to detach him-
self from. Although a loving and supporting, rather than a destructive, presence in 
the autobiographical work, Fannie Segal is, like Gertrude for Hamlet, the point of ref-
erence on which Cavell’s struggle for individuation hinges. In the autobiographical 
work, we thus re-encounter the question of the subject’s individuation — for Cavell 
the crux of the strange detail of King Hamlet’s poisoning through the ear — in the 
auricular trope of perfect pitch.  
 Perfect, or absolute, pitch is the ability to recognize the pitch of a note or pro-
duce any given note. The fact that Cavell’s mother and one of her brothers possessed 
this ability, whilst he did not, was “a source of anguished perplexity,” because it also 
meant that their vocation — a life of music, was not to be his.68 Indeed, his lack of 
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perfect pitch became “one of the reasons [he] would eventually give myself for with-
drawing from music,” and moving towards a life of philosophy.69 Although he could 
not share his mother’s perfect pitch, Cavell felt that “there must be something [he] 
was meant to do that required an equivalent of the enigmatic faculty of perfect 
pitch.”70 Just as for Hamlet, the issue for Cavell was “not to prove that this further life 
was better than another, but to prove that it was mine, that I was born to it, that I was 
born.”71 Vocation is, in this sense, not only a question of what to do but also of who to 
be; it describes the process of becoming — and accepting — who one already is. The 
account of a perfect pitch sought and found thus tells of the birth of his philosophical 
vocation also in terms of the acceptance of his birth and of what birth entails for all of 
us. 
 
 
An Abstraction of Autobiography 
 
That Cavell’s autobiographical account of the childhood accident which left him with 
a scarred tympanum is key to his philosophical project becomes perhaps nowhere 
clearer than in his “Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein’s Inves-
tigations.” Here Cavell brings into focus the “remarkable fact of the presence of the 
figure of the child in Wittgenstein’s thoughts, announced with its opening quotation 
from Augustine.”72 Not unlike autobiography or auricular narratives, the figure of a 
child seems, on first impression, to sit uncomfortably within a philosophical text. Yet, 
that “the subject of beginnings,” the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, 
but also the beginning of philosophy, should immediately be on Cavell’s mind as he 
turns “to work on certain autobiographical materials,” materials furthermore con-
taining the figure of himself as a child, is not fortuitous.73 It is in fact pivotal for Witt-
genstein’s and Cavell’s philosophical projects that the Philosophical Investigations 
should begin by taking us back to the beginning of a philosopher’s life, to his child-
hood. Cavell, for one, is “convinced that Wittgenstein, in incorporating Augustine’s 
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words as his initiating topics, incorporated as well (or finds that he has incorporated, 
in the work making up Philosophical Investigations) the autobiographical as essen-
tial to the work of philosophy, or say recognizes the fate of philosophy to be linked 
with the necessity of confession.”74 The significance of the Investigations’ incipit for 
Cavell’s philosophical project lies in its elevation of a confessional or autobiographical 
to a philosophical, even the philosophical, mode. Augustine the child’s presence, 
however, marks not only the autobiographical element of philosophy; its presence 
reminds us of why Wittgenstein and Cavell turned, of the very reason why anyone 
should turn, to philosophy. What strikes Cavell about the child Augustine as seen 
through the saint’s eyes, through Wittgenstein’s and finally through his own, is the 
“permanence in [its] isolation, the absoluteness in its initial incapacity to make itself 
known, in its absolute reliance on its elders’ recognition of its attempts at expression, 
that is, on their recognition of the grip of its needs.”75 The child’s separateness, the 
fact that it is at the mercy of its elder’s willingness to attune to its needs, epitomizes 
both philosophy’s high stakes and the lure of skepticism.76 
 We cannot speak of Cavell’s damaged left ear and how its scarred tympanum 
listens to autobiography as philosophy without also speaking of psychoanalysis and 
philosophy. Cavell’s path from music to philosophy would, indeed, cross psycho-
analysis. At Julliard, the “disintegration of [his] ambition to compose music” was in 
fact accompanied by a habit of “reading Freud ten or twelve hours a day.”77 Much 
later in life Cavell would enter “psychoanalytic therapy” twice, “both times with a lin-
gering, more or less implicit, idea that [he] might seek a path into practicing clinical 
work [himself].”78 The reasons Cavell gives for his weariness in equating the two dis-
ciplines explain why his pitch was to be of philosophy and not psychoanalysis. He is 
keen to discourage us from concluding that “[his] attraction to philosophy was as to 
an intellectual region from which [he] might avert or provide reparation for scenes of 
inner devastation.”79 All the same, he notes elsewhere that a denial that philosophy is 
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psychoanalysis implies that they are “sufficiently similar to warrant distinguishing.”80 
As a matter of fact, what he wants of philosophy is what he found in Freud, “a secu-
rity of being known, accepted back into the human race,” perhaps even something 
akin to “leading the soul to the light.”81  
 A little earlier, I cautioned that what would concern me here is not Cavell’s 
life an sich. What interests me, instead, is how, like the ordinary language philoso-
pher that he is, in claiming to talk about his own life philosophically, Cavell also 
makes a claim for the philosophical significance of our lives; put differently, the 
autobiographies are philosophically significant because they tell of his life and 
through that of life. Cavell’s autobiography is able to express something about our 
shared human condition — separateness, and the struggle for acknowledgment and 
individuation — for the same reason that “so much of what [Wittgenstein] shows to 
be true of his consciousness is true of ours (of mine).”82 Like all of our words, the 
words with which we describe our lives, discover our forms of life and for Cavell an 
intrinsic part of our forms life is our common separateness. Far from being navel-
gazing, the autobiographical narrative of his scarred tympanum seeks to speak to 
the existential human predicament of separateness. Cavell chooses philosophy over 
psychoanalysis, because what concerns him is not merely his own soul or his 
trauma, but the trauma of being human and of being thus separate. In his autobiog-
raphy he therefore tries to grapple not only with his wounds, but with wounds 
common to all He also chooses philosophy over psychoanalysis because he believes, 
together with Wittgenstein, that only philosophy can provide an efficacious therapy 
for our condition. 
 The story of the scarred tympanum and related auricular narrative or thematic 
strands register not autobiography but “an abstraction of autobiography.”83 They are, 
in short, what Cavell elsewhere calls a “clai[m] to representativeness, expressed auto-
biographically.”84 In writing his autobiographies and in following his pitch of phi-
losophy he seeks, like Wittgenstein and Austin and before them Emerson and Tho-
reau, to write “the autobiography of a species; if not of humanity as a whole, then rep-
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resentative of anyone who finds himself or herself in it.”85 As the resonances between 
the stories of his scarred tympanum and the realities and fantasies of perfect pitch 
suggest, the “abstraction of autobiography” also describes the existential issues that 
his philosophy sets out to address.86 Cavell’s autobiographies more than any other 
part of his work, therefore, reveal the therapeutic ambition of Cavell’s philosophical 
project. By speaking about himself, he also speaks about us; and in seeking to heal his 
scarred tympanum — to acknowledge his separateness — he invites us to begin at-
tending to ours. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 85. Cavell, Little, 6. 
86. Ibid. 
